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Scots law of financial provision on divorce is now 30 years old. The Family Law (Scotland) 
Act 1985 is one of the best known and most respected elements of the Scottish family law 
system and yet, for something so significant and familiar, it has attracted comparatively little 
attention from researchers and commentators.  
The 1985 Act was designed to address the mischiefs of the previous legal system and to 
achieve explicit objectives. Particular problems, which had been identified in respect of the 
pre-1985 law, included a lack of clear guidance, too much judicial discretion, restrictions on 
the orders which courts could make and an over-reliance on continuing periodical allowance. 
The Scottish Law Commission considered that “[w]hat financial provision on divorce should 
seek to achieve is fundamental to the type of legal provision governing it” and, although they 
concluded that no single objective was appropriate, they did identify a range of objectives 
which included the desirability of achieving a clean break between the parties. The resulting 
detailed statutory framework of the 1985 Act - “a highly sophisticated system” (Sutherland) - 
was designed to achieve these objectives by means of a carefully constructed jigsaw of 
orders, principles and guidance. The legislation was carefully planned and well drafted but 
how well has it worked in practice? 
One of the aims of the SLC, in designing the 1985 Act, was to increase the willingness of 
couples to reach agreement and to reduce the need for judicial resolution. To that extent, the 
Act has worked in that there are relatively few reported cases but while there are 
undoubtedly many benefits in settlement, the lack of published judgments makes it more 
difficult to see how the legislation is used.  
While the 1985 Act has been generally well-received over the past three decades, it has also 
attracted some criticism and raised some questions. Compared with the English law on 
ancillary relief, its principled framework appears to leave little space for judicial discretion. 
While its preference for a clean break settlement fits well with modern, simple no-fault 
divorce, Scots law has been criticised for being unduly harsh on the ‘homemaker spouse’. 
While certainty and clarity about the law has undoubtedly been achieved, has it been at the 
expense of fairness? 
In a recent study, funded by the Nuffield Foundation – Mair, Mordaunt and Wasoff, Built to 
Last http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/117617/1/117617.pdf - we analysed a sample of 200 reported 
cases on financial provision, spanning the 30 years during which the 1985 Act has been in 
force, together with in-depth interviews with solicitors, advocates and judges. Using findings 
from that research, this paper will explore how the statutory principles of financial provision 
work in practice.  
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1. Introduction: 30 years of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 
Financial provision on divorce in Scotand was radically reformed by the Family Law 
(Scotland) Act 1985 which introduced a detailed and principled statutory framework. The 
legislation was designed to address the mischiefs of the previous legal system and to 
achieve explicit objectives. Particular problems, which had been identified in respect of the 
pre-1985 law, included a lack of clear guidance as to the nature and purpose of financial 
provision on divorce, too much judicial discretion, restrictions on the types of orders which 
courts could make and an over-reliance on continuing periodical allowance. The Scottish 
Law Commission considered that “[w]hat financial provision on divorce should seek to 
achieve is fundamental to the type of legal provision governing it” and, although they 
concluded that no single objective was appropriate, they did identify a range of objectives 
which included the desirability of achieving a clean break between the parties.  
The legislation was carefully planned and well drafted but how well has it worked in practice? 
After 30 years in force, there have been relatively few published cases and little detailed 
academic analysis. Among the cases which have been reported, the majority have been at 
first instance and, even among those which have been appealed, there has been little 
indication of serious legal issues or problems with the legislation. Anecdotally, Scottish 
family lawyers have tended to speak positively about the 1985 Act and stories of financial 
provision on divorce rarely, if ever, make the headlines in the Scottish media. All of this 
might tend to suggest that the 1985 Act works well.  
Within Scotland, there have been occasional expressions of disappointment at the apparent 
under use of some of the principles but little evidence of real concern and certainly no calls 
for reform. There has, however, been criticism of the Scottish system from England, most 
famously in the comments of Lord Hope in Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane1 and more 
recently in discussion surrounding the Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill (HL) introduced by 
Baroness Deech as a Private Members Bill in the House of Lords. These criticisms have 
focused on a lack of flexibility in the statutory framework, its perceived unfairness and, in 
particular, its harsh treamtment of ‘homemaker’ wives.  
This paper presents evidence from a recent research project funded by the Nuffield 
Foundation: Mair, Mordaunt and Wasoff, Built to Last (2016).2 From the perspective of Scots 
legal practitioners, it explores how well the legislation works, whether it is perceived as being 
unduly inflexible and whether iit is capable of producing outcomes which are fair.  
 
3. A principled system but does it work? 
The Report,3 on which the 1985 Act was based, aimed to clarify and offer  “specific guidance 
to the courts, the legal profession and the public on the purpose or purposes of financial 
provision on divorce, and on the principles to be applied and the factors to be taken into 
consideration in connection therewith”.4 Indeed, the Report emphasised throughout the need 
for financial provision on divorce to be based on a defined set of principles, which are 
available and accessible to all: 
It does not seem satisfactory that questions of social policy, which have very 
important financial consequences for individuals, should turn on informal 
understandings and somewhat arbitrary rules of thumb based on no ascertainable 
principle and known only to a small circle of court practitioners. It seems to us that 
                                                          
1 2006 UKHL 24 per Lord Hope at paras 101-12. 
2 The full report is available at http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/117617/1/117617.pdf. 
3 SLC (No. 67) Family Law: Report on Aliment and Financial Provision, 1981. 
4 Ibid, p82. 
any solicitor in any part of Scotland, even if not a divorce specialist, should be able to 
turn to a statute on financial provision on divorce and find some clear statement of 
the underlying principles on the basis of which he could advise his client and seek to 
negotiate a settlement. That is not possible under the present law.5 
The Act sets out five principles6 - fair sharing of matrimonial property; baancing of economic 
advantage and disadvantage; fair sharing of the economic burden of childcare for any child 
of the family up to the age of 16; a period of readjustment ( up to a maximum of three years) 
where one spouse has been substantially dependent on the other; relief of serious financial 
hardship resulting from the divorce.  The court may make a number of orders7 where they 
are justifiied by one or more of these principles and where they are reasonable with regard 
to the resources of the parties.8 The Act goes on, in the following sections, to set out further 
detailled guidance on the application of each of the principles and the appropriate use of 
each of the orders. The resulting detailed statutory framework of the 1985 Act is “a highly 
sophisticated system” (Sutherland); a carefully constructed jigsaw of orders, principles and 
guidance.  
The principled nature of the statutory system is clearly consistent with the philosophy of the 
Report which preceded its coming into force, but does this principled system work? One of 
the criticisms that is sometimes made of the Scottish system is that it is overly restrictive; 
that by sticking strictly to its principles it lacks flexibility. Certainty, it is sometimes argued, is 
achieved at the expense of discretion and fairness. The question of fairness is highlighted in 
particular in respect of ‘homemaker wives’. Whereas the ‘needs’ of the ex-wife would be 
highlighted and addressed in England, in Scotland it is argued that she receives no special 
treatment beyond the possibility of an order under the fourth principle – readjustment – and 
even there any period of readjustment is subject to a statutory maximum of three years.  
These were issues which were explored in the context of our research through interviews 
with a sample of 30 solicitors, advocates and judges. The following extracts give some 
flavour of the range of views expressed. 
 
3. 1 A balance between certainty and flexibility 
Overall, interviewees considered the principles were sufficiently flexible for their needs, i.e. 
to achieve fair outcomes for clients.  Generally, there was no appetite for changes to the 
principles because: 
Do I wish for more flexibility?  No, I don’t think so.  I think that we gain very much 
from a reasonably rigid structure limiting judicial discretion. Take the example of the 
Forth Road Bridge, which is a wonderfully strong structure, thank goodness, because 
I drive across it every day, but it does sway a bit.  And if it didn’t sway a bit with 
changes of temperature and with high winds, it would fall down.  It’s got to have … 
some inbuilt flexibility in it, but I don’t want anymore, because that would encourage 
speculative litigation and go down the English route. [Solicitor 05] 
In headlines about the Scottish system of financial provision, the focus is often on the bare 
principles and indeed often only on the first principle – fair sharing of matrimonial property – 
and the fourth principle – readjustment. A common theme throughout the interviews was the 
importance of considering all five of the principles and of recognising that the principles do 
not sit within the Act in isolation.  They are, rather, part of an integrated framework set within 
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6 1985 Act, s9. 
7 1985 Act, s9. 
8 1985 Act, s8(2). 
the double-pronged approach of what is fair and what is reasonable.9  When the framework 
is taken as a package it can be very flexible: “if section 9 was viewed in isolation it wouldn’t 
be enough, but … when you then take account of the other sections of the Act [especially] … 
the over-arching principle … of fairness … that probably gives us the flexibility that we need.” 
[Solicitor 20]  Such fairness values all contributions to the marriage sharing: “fairly the fruits 
of the labour of the parties during their marriage …  that labour can be working, or looking 
after children, or keeping the house, whatever it may be”. [Solicitor 20]   
The principles were seen as a positive means of achieving fairness for clients; there was no 
sense that practitioners were fighting against the principles to achieve such fairness: “I don’t 
find them a strait-jacket at all, I find them more like signposts along the way.  So no, 
definitely not a strait-jacket.  I don’t feel they stop me doing anything”. [Solicitor 06]  This was 
an approach adopted by agents and judges alike.  Despite the fact that the Act had set 
certainty before judicial discretion, there was sufficient flexibility within the principles to allow 
for a level of interpretation:  
… in this court we don’t feel so constrained, in the sense that we can bend principle 
as we want it. … I don’t find the language in the … Act inhibits me terribly. … And 
there are degrees of flexibility built into it, and I think you can stretch them a fair bit: 
but I’ve never felt the need to stretch them in a way, which … would be doing 
violence to the language of it. [Judge 30] 
The codified, principled approach of the ’85 Act, offering a level of certainty, was summed up 
as resulting in: “people spend[ing] a lot less in legal expenses in Scotland than in other parts 
of the world, particularly England, and we can give them a reasonable range of outcomes”. 
[Advocate 22]  The structured nature of the principles was generally welcomed: 
“I like the principles … the fact that there is a structured way in which we can advise 
our clients. … If you look at England … they are very much reliant on previous orders 
… but also it is often worth their having a go in terms of the litigation … I don’t think 
that is a nice situation for clients”. [Solicitor 17]   
In Scotland clients could understand, from the outset, what outcomes would be likely: “a 
client will come in and say this is my story. … Because of the flexibility and … discretion 
afforded to the sheriff I always say to clients – ‘Here is the range of possible outcomes … 
that’s your parameter’”. [Solicitor 18]  The level of certainty meant that practitioners were 
able to place before a client: “a set of spread sheets and say – ‘Look, the range of … 
outcomes … is between this and this, and if we can get an outcome somewhere in this 
range we’ll be doing quite well’. [Advocate 22]  Such certainty means: “Scotland has traded 
flexibility for certainty … that’s just the way you’ve got it”. [Advocate 22]  And on the whole 
practitioners liked the way they’d got it, because it was seen to serve the majority well – no 
mean feat: “for a vast majority of our cases, the certainty it produces is beneficial to clients 
because it saves … money on litigation, … [reducing] fall-outs over money and children.  
Because you’ve got certainty, you know what the outcomes are going to be … there is a 
huge benefit in that”. [Solicitor 12] 
Flexibility and certainty could be viewed as extremes: 
On the one hand, you would have complete flexibility and nobody would know where 
they were – and in England they just make it up as they go along – and then, on the 
other hand, you’ve got a very strict view of the legislation, as if it’s kind of, back of an 
envelope – ‘What’s the matrimonial property?  Divide it 50/50 and that’s an end of it’, 
which is far too simplistic.  And somewhere in the middle … you’ve got something 
that works, which is a matrimonial property regime, but with an ability to mitigate the 
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worst effects of that by allowing for unequal sharing and economic disadvantage. 
[Judge 29] 
Of course, there is a balance to be struck between flexibility and certainty: it is not a straight 
either/or.  While it was generally recognised that the English system gave a high level of 
flexibility, it was seen to come at too high a price: “the only way you can create true flexibility 
is to have an English system, which isn’t based on principle at all, and I wouldn’t favour such 
an approach”. [Judge 29]  No one looked with complete admiration at such flexibility, which 
allowed a high level of discretion to the courts: “I would be very unenthusiastic about us 
expressly introducing more discretion, because I see day in and day out the damage that 
does down south”. [Solicitor 01]   
There was no appetite for any such change: “I wouldn’t want to see more creativity, more 
flexibility, in the terms of the statute.  I don’t think that will be a good idea.  We gain so much 
from the certainty that people can have, and the courts would be much more flooded with 
speculative cases if we allowed that to happen”. [Solicitor 05]  The structured nature of the 
framework was considered to be helpful: “because you then know what types of orders the 
court is likely to make … it's probably a good thing that there is less creativity when placed in 
the hands of the court”. [Solicitor 17]  However, trading flexibility for certainty did not mean 
the Scottish system was without any flexibility of its own – that was far from the case: “there 
is huge flexibility there”. [Solicitor 18]  Indeed, there was a view that: “the Act provides as 
much flexibility as you like … if you read Little v Little10 and Jacques v Jacques11 together, 
there’s effectively an unfettered discretion and so it’s not the Act that doesn’t give flexibility”. 
[Judge 29]  
Interviewees liked the structure the principles afforded their clients, which enabled them to 
focus more exactly on aspects of their case, avoiding expensive and possibly acrimonious 
litigation: 
A lot of people come in … and say – ‘I want … to fight this all the way’.  A lot of the 
time we have to sit down and say to them – ‘Well, you can only fight within these 
principles … because if you are unrealistic … then … you are less likely to win … this 
battle that you think you are going to have’. … In England they end up in these 
horrible, costly litigations because they don’t have such structured principles to rely 
on.  So … in terms of people, from a psychological perspective, I like the fact that the 
principles are structured. [Solicitor 17] 
 
3.2 But is it fair? 
It is the statutory principles in section 9, rather than a general concept of ‘fairness’, which 
underpin the Scottish system of financial provision and sometimes that may lead to criticism 
that the legislation pays insufficient attention to the question of whether or not the outcomes 
are fair. Fairness is of course built into the legislation: it is most obviously central to the first 
principle – the ‘fair’ sharing of matrimonial property12 – but it is a very structured path to 
fairness rather than a general concept.  
To achieve a fair outcome is: “the whole point of the Act”. [Advocate 21]  However, fairness, 
as we have noted, was considered to be: “a subjective quality. … What I think is fair and 
what my opponent thinks is fair and indeed what the sheriff thinks is fair can all be different. 
[Solicitor 18]  In order to ameliorate such subjectivity, creativity must be set within the: “two-
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fold … test – the orders have to be justified by the principles, but then also have to be 
reasonable having regards to parties’ resources”. [Solicitor 18]   
Words and concepts other than ‘fairness’ were used, such as ‘acceptable outcome’. But 
what is an acceptable outcome? It could be: “Where each party is equally unhappy” [Solicitor 
05] – on the face of it a glib response, but actually a very telling one.  It is easy when sitting 
at a desk removed from clients and their concerns to forget the level of human misery that 
divorce may bring with it:  
“it’s a great privilege of a family lawyer to take people who are having such a bad 
time and try and make it better. … That’s the joy of the job, to take people who, … if 
you do your job right, are going to be happier at the end than they were at the 
beginning”. [Solicitor 05]   
It could be the obverse: “Two happy clients. … But, actually, if I achieve a reasonably 
satisfied client then that’s it.  None of them is ever happy, you know, they’re not happy, but I 
want a client to have a fair and reasonable outcome”. [Solicitor 06]  So, perhaps: “An 
acceptable outcome to the client is one where they are equally happy, or equally miserable 
to the other party’s response”. [Solicitor 13] 
Happiness is rarely a factor of a divorce.  Far more significant is to achieve a level of 
fairness for a client: “if I can get them to accept the reality of the situation, if they go out of 
here thinking … that every aspect’s been dealt with, that I’ve had my corner fought, that I’ve 
got a fair outcome, that’s all I want my clients to think”. [Solicitor 06]  In order to achieve such 
fairness a family lawyer spends: “a lot of time trying to pour oil on troubled waters and finding 
solutions rather than just resolutions”. [Solicitor 07]  Clients often begin with a list of 
demands and need to be guided to: “articulate what they think would be a fair outcome”, 
which often means challenging them to imagine if: “the boot were on the other foot … if you 
can get them to consider that, then that goes a long way to resolving the problem”. [Solicitor 
09]  Thus, clients were encouraged to think: “about what’s fair, not only what’s fair to them 
but what’s fair overall”. [Solicitor 20]  Being pragmatic, an acceptable outcome would, 
therefore, be one where:  
“both parties leave that process with an outcome that they can live with.  If … you 
meet somebody in a pub sobbing into his beer saying – ‘She took the shirt off my 
back’, I take the view that you were badly advised, or … you ignored advice, because 
that should not be an outcome”. [Solicitor 13] 
It was suggested that most clients would say that the Act serves neither party well at an 
emotional level, because it does not focus on their individual contributions made to the 
marriage.  However, that was actually seen as a very positive aspect of the Act, enabling the 
agent to say to the client: 
… this was a partnership. … And actually this is not about … the court vindicating 
your sense of yourself. … The point is what we are … doing is a really quite blunt, 
rough and ready assessment … that’s a good thing.  Rather than … there [being] an 
overwhelming focus on trying to give weight to things like contributions and needs, 
which happens down south … and is so damaging in the longer term. [Solicitor 01] 
For a client to feel that an outcome is fair it needs to fulfil their: “expectations and that's a 
question of the judgment of the practitioner, as to how you set those expectations” and the 
principles are central as: “the default position”. [Solicitor 14]  Clarifying what a client wishes 
to achieve within the context of the principles should lead to a reasonable outcome where: 
“they were both able to move on without one of them being over burdened one way or the 
other”, [Solicitor 15] which may well mean: “without on-going dependence on the former 
spouse, if at all possible”. [Judge 29]  While an agent may take account of their client’s 
expectations, a judge takes no account of either party’s hopes and feelings: “I don’t take that 
into account. … An acceptable outcome for me is one where I feel I’ve produced the fairest 
result that I can in the circumstances of the parties’ finances”. [Judge 31] 
Another way of assessing outcomes is to look at the number of appeals, which: “are very few 
… in family cases. … There must be some thing about the system that’s working pretty well.  
I don’t think it’s just the cost of appealing that is inhibiting people … even in big money Court 
of Session cases the number of appeals is very few”. [Solicitor 13] 
 
3. 3 Is it harsh on wives? 
The 1985 Act marked a very significant change in the Scottish legal approach to financial 
provision on divorce; quite distinct from the previous more discretionary system. It was a 
change closely linked to the Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976 and its move towards no-fault 
divorce; a link which was reflected in the 1985 Act’s preference for clean break and private 
resolution, neutrality towards fault and focus on independence and moving forward. This 
new system of financial provision was conceived at the beginning of the 1980s; an era of 
optimism about feminism and gender equality, following close on the introduction in the 
1970s of statutory commitments to equal pay and equal treatment for women. The 1985 Act 
emerged at a time of transition from a more traditional breadwinner/homemaker model of 
marriage to a modern vision based on equal partnership. After 30 years, there are still 
debates about no-fault divorce and there is ongoing frustration at the slow progress towards 
gender equality and particularly towards equal pay. On reflection, although the model of the 
1985 Act was well suited to anticipated gender equality and neutrality in work and family, 
does it produce harsh consequences where gender equality remains an aspiration rather 
than a reality? 
While the fourth principle (s9(1)(d)) provides for a period of readjustment following divorce, 
and may give rise to an order for periodical allowance, the period is restricted to three years. 
When the Scottish approach to financial provision is criticised for being harsh on women, 
attention is usually focused on this provision: “I’d like to … remove the maximum of three 
years” [Advocate 26] “I think five years would be better”. [Solicitor 19] It was felt to be: “quite 
harsh” [Solicitor 14] and there needed to be: “more flexibility … for some people, providing 
longer than three years to get PA. … It’s just for a very small number of cases”. [Judge 30] 
The problem was outlined as follows: 
You think – ‘We’ve done a deal, we’ve split the assets down the middle, you’ve got 
another couple of years really minor financial support coming in, then you’ve got your 
child support and you are on your own.’ – And you cast forward to where that person 
will be in five years’ time … if you actually do that you begin to realise that there are 
some people who are going to be struggling quite significantly if their support is cut 
after three years.  And this might be in circumstances where their ex is earning very 
significantly and able to go from strength to strength, whilst they are not. [Solicitor 03] 
Compensation and maintenance are not concepts that sit easily within Scots law, but there 
were interviewees who spoke in these terms in connection with wives from long marriages 
who had no future prospects of earning, unlike their husbands.  These concepts are English 
in nature, not Scottish and while no one was suggesting: “going over to that system where 
joint lives order are much more common, I do sometimes wonder if the substantive fairness 
has been done to women”. [Solicitor 03]  
 
4. It’s good legislation 
Overwhelmingly, the message from the practitioners we interviewed was that they welcomed 
and appreciated the legislation. The 1985 Act was regarded as being “a very good piece of 
legislation” [Advocate 22]: “a gem” [Solicitor 05]. It is clear and well drafted. It is complex and 
sophisticated but it has been carefully constructed and the provisions are well signposted 
and well integrated. Through its principles, the legislation offers certainty but the detailed 
guidance and range of factors within which those principles must be applied ensure flexibility 
and scope for creative outcomes. There was widespread respect for the legislation and 
almost no desire for change. In fact there was a positive message from practitioners that 
they did not want substantial change.  
There were many aspects of the legislation, which were thought to contribute to its success 
but the section 9 principles in particular were praised. They were seen as achieving clarity 
and certainty while still allowing for flexibility. The first principle was quite clearly the starting 
point and the most significant but in the interviews, the point was stressed that each of them 
was needed and there was no enthusiasm for changing them. Central to the success of the 
legislation was the combination and interconnectedness of the individual principles 
themselves and of the principles with the other guiding factors. Section 8(2) in particular, 
which requires the application of the principles against a broader context of what is fair and 
reasonable with regard to resources, was key to achieving an acceptable balance between 
certainty and discretion.  
While the legislation itself was sound and there was no need, or appetite, for change, there 
was also a clear message that it could be used to greater effect and this was a consistent 
message across all groups of interviewees. Reflecting on their experience, many expressed 
views about the possibilities for more imaginative use of the legislation; the need sometimes 
for more ambitious construction of argument; the importance of providing the necessary 
evidence to allow the sheriff or judge to make more creative judgments. If there were 
problems with the law of financial provision, it was not the fault of the legislation itself but of 
those who used it. Occasionally interviewees in one group, for example sheriffs, indicated 
things that those in another group, for example solicitors, might do in order to make the 
legislation work better. It was notable that these comments were very evenly matched 
across all groups and there was no sense of fault lying in any one particular area or of one 
group blaming another. Rather there was a collective acknowledgement that the 1985 Act 
worked well but had the potential to work even better: a view summed up by this comment 
from a sheriff: “It’s about people actually thinking about the principles and pleading them and 
using them, and sheriffs and judges going through them and applying them.” [Sheriff 28] 
 
 
 
 
